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INTRODUCTION
Trade and environmental concerns unfortunately have not found
much common ground over the last few years. Some high profile disputes
have focused a great deal of attention on the problems encountered by
nations, seeking both to liberalize trade and protect the environment.'
Critics of the multilateral trading system view the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as working for goals diametrically opposed to the
protection of endangered species and the environment. The two Tuna-
Dolphin decisions by dispute settlement panels under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 system, and the WTO
panel decision in the Reformulated Gasoline dispute, did nothing to
change the minds of environmentalists, conservationists, or others opposed
to the multilateral efforts to liberalize trade regimes.
This article focuses on the dispute between the United States and
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand concerning the efforts of the
United States to protect endangered sea turtles through a ban on the
importation of shrimp from certain nations, harvested in a manner likely to
threaten sea turtles.
The central focus of the dispute is the interpretation of Article XX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). Article XX
provides WTO Members certain exceptions to their obligations under
' See generally United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report]; United
States-Standard for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29,
1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report]; United States-Taxes
on Automobiles, DS31/R (Oct. 11, 1994) [hereinafter CAFt Panel Report]; United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at
155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I Panel
Report]; United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS20/R (June
1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994)[hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II Panel Report].
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other'provisions of GATT 1994 and the agreements comprising the WTO
Agreement. As would be expected, the parties' interpretations of Article
XX vary and are often contradictory, but more surprisingly is the extent to
which panels and the Appellate Body come into conflict over the
provisions of Article XX. It is increasingly unclear exactly what type of
measure will be allowed as an exception to WTO Members' obligations
under Article XX. This dispute exemplifies the tension between trade and
environmental groups and the societal issues touched upon by the ever
increasing pressure to liberalize trade regimes. This dispute also brings
into focus the pressure on WTO Members to adhere to their obligations
under the WTO Agreement and the domestic pressures to pursue certain
environmental objectives.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE DISPUTE
On October 8, 1996, four Members of the WTO filed a joint
complaint against the United States concerning its ban on the importation
of shrimp and shrimp products from certain nations.2 The four nations,
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, all exporters of shrimp and
shrimp products, objected to the U.S. ban on the grounds that it violated
U.S. commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994.3
Specifically, the complainants argued that the ban on the
importation of shrimp and shrimp products from these and other nations
found not to be in compliance with section 609 of Public Law 101-162,
violated Articles I, XI, and XIII of GATT 1994. In addition, the
complaining parties claimed that the U.S. import ban nullified and
impaired benefits accruing to these nations.4 According to Article 3.8 of
2 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 988,
1037.
1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A (Apr. 15, 1994), in THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, 33
I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
4 See GATT, supra note 3. Article XXIII, entitled Nullification or Impairment, provides
that:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded as the result of
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the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes,5 once a Member establishes that another Member breached one
of the rules or violated its obligations under one of the covered
agreements, the action to constitute a prima facie case of nullification or
impairment is considered.
The primary argument being advanced by the complaining parties
was that Article XI of GATT 1994 provided for the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports. Because the scope of
Article XI is comprehensive, the Article applies to the U.S. embargo
because the measure was not in the nature of duties, taxes or other
charges.6
A. The Endangered Species Act
In 1973 the United States Congress passed the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).7 In the findings, purposes and policy section of the ESA,
Congress sets out the reasons for passage of the Act.
Sec. 2. (a) Findings.-The Congress finds and declares
that-
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the
United States have been rendered extinct as a
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry
out its obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration
to the representations or proposals made to it.
Id. art. XXIII.
' See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA
(Apr. 15, 1994), in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
6 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/R, para. 3.136 (April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report].
' Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 1973 U.S C.A.A.N. (87 Stat.)
884 (1973), as amended.
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consequence of economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have
been so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or
threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of
aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational,
and scientific value to the Nation and its people;
(4) the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign
state in the international community to conserve to the
extent practicable the various species of fish or wildlife
and plants facing extinction, pursuant to -
(A) migratory bird treaties with Canada and
Mexico;
(B) the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty
with Japan;
(C) the Convention on Nature Protection and
Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere;
(D) the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries;
(E) the International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean;
(F) the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora;
and
(G) other international agreements;
(5) encouraging the States and other interested parties,
through Federal financial assistance and a system of
incentives, to develop and maintain conservation
programs which meet national and international
standards is a key to meeting the Nation's international
commitments and to better safeguarding, for the benefit
of all citizens, the Nation's heritage in fish and wildlife.
(b) Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may
be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and
conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
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(c) Policy.-It is further declared to be the policy of
Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall
seek to conserve endangered species and threatened
species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance
of the purposes of this Act.'
The above language illustrates the desire of Congress to provide a
means by which endangered species could be protected and tasks all
federal departments and agencies to assist in this effort.
In furtherance of the policy, and under the authority of the ESA,
regulations were issued by the Department of Commerce (DOC), National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in 1987 requiring the use by shrimp
fishermen of turtle excluder devices (TEDs).9 Prior to the regulations,
NMFS began a voluntary TEDs program in 1983. The voluntary program
was not successful because a sufficient amount of TEDs were not being
used on a regular basis.' ° The 1987 regulations, in contrast, required that
all shrimp trawlers use conservation measures, including TEDs and tow
time restrictions, when fishing for shrimp in certain waters off the coast of
the United States"
81d. §2.
'See 52 Fed. Reg. 24244 (1987).
'oSee id. at 24245.
"See id. at 24247.
Under these regulations the use of TEDs or tow time
restrictions are required in all waters of the Atlantic between the North
Carolina-Virginia border and 230 40' N and throughout the U.S. Gulf
of Mexico. Based on seasonal requirements, Atlantic and Gulf waters
are each divided into two areas. These are called the Canaveral, the
Atlantic, the Southwest Florida and Gulf Areas. These areas are
defined as follows: (a) Canaveral Area - includes all ocean and tidal
waters between 280 N and 290 N in the Atlantic Ocean; (b) Atlantic
Area - includes all ocean and tidal waters in the Atlantic ocean from
the North Carolina-Virginia border to 230 40' N, except for waters in
the Canaveral Area; (c) Southwest Florida Area - includes all ocean
and tidal waters within the region bounded by 23* N to 270 N between
810 W and 840 W; and (d) The Gulf Area - includes all ocean and
tidal waters of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico except for waters in the
Southwest Florida Area - includes all ocean and tidal waters within the
region bounded by 230 N to 270 N between 810 W and 840 W; and (d)
The Gulf Area - includes all ocean and tidal waters of the U.S. gulf of
Mexico except for waters in the Southwest Florida Area.
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B. Section 609 of Public Law 101-162
In 1989 Congress passed the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990.2
Section 609 of this Act provided that the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, should" (1) initiate negotiations as soon
as possible for the development of bilateral or multinational agreements
with other nations for the protection and conservation of such species of
sea turtles."' 3 In addition to the initiation of negotiations, the law requires
that the importation of shrimp or shrimp products, which have been
harvested in such a manner as to adversely affect species of sea turtles,
shall be prohibited no later than May 1, 1991. The ban is not to apply to
nations which the President certifies annually.'4
C. The Guidelines ..-
In 1991, the State Department issued guidelines for determining
comparability of foreign programs for the protection of turtles in shrimp
Id. at 24247-48.
12 Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988.
13 Id. § 609(a)(1).
14 See id. § 609(b)(2).
Certification Procedure-The ban on importation of shrimp or products
from shrimp pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not apply if the President
shall determine and certify to Congress not later than May 1, 1991, and
annually thereafter that-
(A) the government of the harvesting nation has
provided documentary evidence of the adoption of a
regulatory program governing the incidental taking
of such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting
that is comparable to the United States; and
(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by
vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable to the
average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles by the
United States vessels in the course of such
harvesting; or
(C) the particular fishing environment or the
harvesting nation does not pose a threat of the
incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of
such harvesting.
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trawl fishing operations.' 5  The State Department determined that the
scope of section 609 was limited to the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic
region.'6
In passing section 609, Congress recognized that these
conservation measures taken by U.S. shrimp fishermen would be of
limited effectiveness unless a similar level of protection is afforded
throughout the turtles' migratory range across the Gulf of Mexico,
Caribbean, and western central Atlantic (Wider Caribbean Region).
It was determined that nations in the wider Caribbean with
commercial shrimp trawl operations, through whose waters these sea
turtles migrate, are: Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana,
Suriname, French Guiana, and Brazil.'
The guidelines also set out that the import restrictions did not
apply to aquaculture shrimp because harvesting such shrimp does not
affect sea turtles."
The guidelines also established that the use of approved TEDs
were required "in areas and at times when there is a likelihood of
intercepting sea turtles."' 9 Smaller vessels, those under 25 feet, could use
restricted tow times in lieu of TEDs.2' The goal of the program, according
to the guidelines, was to protect sea turtle populations from further decline
by reducing their incidental mortality in shrimp trawl operations.2
Under these guidelines there was a three-year phase-in period for
foreign nations of a comparable regulatory program.22 In order to be
certified as having a comparable regulatory program, the foreign nation
was required to submit documentary evidence of a program including the
following elements: (1) No retention of incidentally caught sea turtles;
(2) Resuscitation of comatose incidentally caught sea turtles; (3)
Reduction of incidental taking satisfied by either (a) a commitment to
require all shrimp trawl vessels to use TEDs at all times (or reduce tow
times if a vessel is under 25 feet) (to be phased in over a period not more
'" See Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations Protection; Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg.
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than three-years) or (b) a commitment to study the impact of shrimp trawl
fishing on sea turtles and develop technologies to reduce incidental
mortality of sea turtles to "insignificant levels;"23 and (4) Credible
enforcement efforts which monitor compliance and the imposition of
appropriate sanctions.2 4
Programs including the above elements had to be certified, by May
1, annually." The annual certifications would only be granted if a
program contained three elements: (1) Achievement of program goals-
providing evidence that the goals established in the initial timetables have
been reached; (2) Compliance and Enforcement-assessment of
compliance with the program and a report on enforcement activities,
including measures taken against vessel owners; and (3) Scientific
Cooperation-affected nation must accommodate reasonable requests by
the United States for scientific data and fisheries data as well as requests
2 The third element specifically states:
At the time of requesting an initial positive determination, many
affected nations may not have data on the incidental taking of sea turtle
in their shrimp trawl fishery. The element will therefore be satisfied if
there is either:
(a) A commitment to require all shrimp trawl vessels
to use TEDs at all times (or reduce tow times if the
vessel is under 25 feet). This requirement may be
phased in over a period of not more than three years.
The program description should establish a timetable
during which TEDs use will be phased in; or
(b) A commitment to engage in a statistically reliable
and verifiable scientific program to determine times
and areas of turtle abundance and assess the impact
of the shrimp trawl fishery on sea turtles; to develop
and assess technologies to reduce the impact of the
shrimp trawl fishery on sea turtles; and to require the
use of fishing technologies and techniques that will
reduce the incidental mortality of sea turtles in the
shrimp trawl fishery to insignificant levels. A
program will be found comparable if it contains these
elements and if the period of assessment and
implementation is not more than three years. The
program description should establish a timetable by
which each phase of the program is to be completed.
Id. at 1051-52.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 1052.
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for specific scientific and technological cooperation.26 . The guidelines also
provide for ongoing consultations between affected nations and the State
Department.27
On December 4, 1992, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) issued new regulations on the U.S. domestic sea turtle
conservation program.2 The revised regulations for the domestic program
required shrimp trawlers to comply with turtle conservation measures
throughout the year in all areas and eliminated the option of restricted tow
times, in lieu of using TEDs, for shrimp trawlers under 25 feet in offshore
waters as of January 1, 1993.29 In addition, shrimp trawlers in inshore
waters were required to use TEDs unless they were equipped with a single
net with a "headrope length of less than 35 feet and a footrope length of
less than 44 feet." 0 If so equipped, the trawlers could still use restricted
tow times.3'
In 1993, the State Department revised the guidelines so that they
would be more in line with the U.S. domestic program. 2  The State
Department's guidelines eliminated the second option for certification for
foreign nations (i.e., use of TEDs not required if it could be determined
that the level of the incidental capture in those areas and times did not
warrant their use).33 Under the 1993 Guidelines, certification would
depend on the use of TEDs in all areas at all times.34 Merely requiring the
use of TEDs would not ensure certification for affected nations. In order
to be certified, the turtle conservation program of each affected nation had
to contain enforcement provisions to compel compliance with the TED
requirement.35
In particular, the 1993 Guidelines set out that each affected nation
must require the use of TEDs on a significant number of shrimp trawl
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Restrictions Applicable to Shrimp Trawlers and Other Fisheries, 57 Fed. Reg.
57,348 (1992) to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 217 and 227 [hereinafter 1992 Revised
Regulations].29 See id. at 57,348.
30 id.
31 See id.
32 Revised Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the
Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 9015, 9016
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Guidelines].
33 See id. at 9016.
34 See id. at 9016-17.
35 See id. at 9017.
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vessels by May 1, 1993.36 As of May 1, 1994, the use of TEDs would be
required on all commercial shrimp trawl vessels in the affected nations.37
In order to be certified in 1994 and the years thereafter, affected nations
had to require that all commercial shrimp trawl vessels use TEDs at all
times. The exceptions to the use of TEDs allowed under the domestic
regulations were also applicable to the foreign vessels.3"
D. The Court of International Trade
In June 1994, certain environmental organizations, animal
protection organizations, and an association of domestic fishermen3 9
brought an action in the United States Court of International Trade'
against the Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce and certain Assistant Secretaries, to compel greater
international enforcement of the Endangered Species Act provisions for
the protection of endangered sea turtles.41
The plaintiffs claimed that the limitation on the scope of section
609, by the State Department's Guidelines, to the wider Caribbean/western
Atlantic region was a violation of the plain language of the statute.4' The




"' The plaintiffs were Earth Island Institute, a California Nonprofit Corporation; Todd
Steiner; The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, a New York
Nonprofit Corporation; the Humane Society of the United States, a Delaware Nonprofit
Corporation; The Sierra Club, a California Nonprofit Corporation; and The Georgia
Fisherman's Association, Inc., a Georgia Corporation. See Earth Island Inst. v.
Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
40 The U.S. Court of International Trade was created by Pub. L. No. 96-417, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 1727, (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1994)) (indicating that the
Ct. Int'l Trade was the successor to the U.S. Customs Court).
41 See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (holding,
inter alia, that Endangered Species Act provisions are without geographic boundary and
that global enforcement is mandatory despite potential conflicts with GATT). See also
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
statute banning importation of shrimp from countries that did not use TEDs was an
"embargo" and that the Ct. Int'l Trade had exclusive jurisdiction over the action); Earth
Island Inst. v. Christopher, 890 F. Supp. 1085, 1087, 1095 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (holding
plaintiffs were entitled to seek judicial review of Department of Commerce certification
of foreign turtle protection programs).42 See Earth Island Inst., 913 F. Supp. at 562.
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-scope of its implementation" and the State Department's "delimitation...
[was] reasonable. 4 3  The Court, however, interpreted the statute
differently than the United States:
The starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself....
Here, the court finds the statute Congress has
decided to enact to be clear and unambiguous in regard to
its scope. Its language includes "all foreign governments
which are engaged in, or which have persons or companies
engaged in, commercial fishing operations which ... may
affect adversely [endangered or threatened] species of sea
turtles" and "protection of specific ocean and land regions
which are of special significance to the health and stability
of such species of sea turtles" and "amendment of any
existing international treaty for the protection and
conservation of such species of sea turtles to which the
United States is a party" and "each nation" which conducts
commercial shrimp fishing operations within the
geographic range of distribution of such sea turtles and
which may affect them adversely. No language of section
609 restricts its geographical purview, nor can the court
accept the premise that the statute is simply silent on the
matter.44
Counsel for the United States argued that the legislative history of
section 609 supported thc government's reading of the statute. In the
court's view there was "hardly any history" and although the history did
tend to focus on the oceanic region chosen by the State Department, "such
focus does not mean that either the legislative process itself, or more
importantly, the adopted result thereof was or is so restricted. ' 4
Another argument put forward by the United States was that
Congress had acquiesced to the State Department's construction of the
statute." In support of this argument the United States pointed out that the
State Department's interpretation that section 609 only applied to the
41 id. at 574-575.
4Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).45 Id. at 576.
46 See id. at 577.
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"wider Caribbean," was clearly stated during a 1990 hearing, and that
Congress, by not taking any action, acquiesced to this interpretation.47 The
authority cited to support this argument did not convince the Court
because the State Department's approach was not long-standing and
Congress had never revisited section 609.48
In the absence of any such extended, meaningful
interaction between the executive and legislative branches
which could support judicial reliance on the appearance of
congressional acquiescence, the critical, unrefuted facts on
this issue in this case remain plaintiff Steiner's estimate
that 124,000 sea turtles continue to drown annually due to
shrimping by countries other than the United States, that
Congress (and the President) agreed on enactment of
section 609 in an attempt to diminish the carnage, and that
the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the view that the
plain intent of this kind of legislation is to halt and reverse
the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost, and
to give endangered species priority over the primary
missions of federal agencies.49
The Court concluded that it was its responsibility to determine
"what the law is" and in its view the purview of section 609 was clear on
its face, and not susceptible to differing interpretationsO The State
Department's guidelines regarding foreign comparability with the U.S.
domestic program were found not to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law within the meaning of
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)," based on the record developed in the case.52
47 See Earth Island Inst., 913 F. Supp. at 577 (citing Sea Turtle Conservation and the
Shrimp Industry: Hearing on the Effectiveness of Federal Efforts to Protect Endangered
Species of Sea Turtles and the Impact of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDS) on the Shrimp
Fishing Industry Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Env't of the House of Representatives Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101'
Cong. 35 (May 1, 1990)).
4 See id. (citing Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974)).49 Id. at 577-578.
5o See id. at 578.
"' See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-560 (1994).
52 See Earth island Inst., 913 F. Supp. at 579.
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However, the CIT concluded that defendants were not properly
enforcing section 609 because the mandate had been restricted "to the Gulf
of Mexico-Caribbean Sea-western Atlantic Ocean., 53 Hence, the Court
instructed the United States to enforce section 609 on a global basis.
Ergo, the defendants are hereby directed to prohibit
not later than May 1, 1996 the importation of shrimp or
products of shrimp wherever harvested in the wild with
commercial fishing technology which may affect adversely
those species of sea turtles the conservation of which is the
subject of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Commerce on June 29, 1987, 52 Fed.Reg. [sic] 24,244,
except as provided in Pub.L. [sic] No. 101-162 § 609(b)(2),
16 U.S.C. § 1537 note, and to report the results thereof to
the court on or before May 31, 1996, at which time entry of
final judgment will be taken under advisement.54
Interestingly for the purposes of the WTO dispute, the defendant-
intervenors, the National Fisheries Institute, Inc., raised the issue of the
consistency of section 609 with U.S. obligations under GATT. "Indeed, in
two instances GATT dispute panels have found analogous embargo
provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §
1361, et. seq.... to be violative of GATT principles. A GATT challenge
to operation of [section 609] would likely produce the same
conclusions."' 55
3 Id. at 580.
4 Id. (alterations in original).
5 Id. at 579. The court further quotes the Defendant-Intervenor's Memorandum:
Obviously, this Court, in construing [section 609] cannot eliminate all
infirmities under GATT. No matter what, as the Federal Defendants
concede, [section 609] applies to the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic
region, and such application could surely be subject to GATT
challenge. Nonetheless, NFI suggests that a corollary of The Charming
Betsy principle must be that, even if all conflict with international
obligations cannot be eliminated, still it is appropriate to seek to
minimize or reduce conflict to the maximum extent possible. In this
case, that means construing [s]ection 609 so that it affects the fewest
nations and products possible consistent with its statutory purposes.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Because of the CIT's decision, the State Department had to revise
its guidelines concerning the comparability of foreign programs with the
U.S. sea turtle conservation program.
E. The Revised Guidelines Mandated by the CIT Decision
On April 19, 1996, the State Department issued new guidelines. 6
Under the new guidelines, section 609 would be enforced on a world-wide
basis as the CIT had ordered in its opinion issued in 1995. Beginning on
May 1, 1996, all shipments of shrimp and products of shrimp into the
United States were required to be accompanied by a declaration (DSP-121,
revised) attesting that the shrimp accompanying the declaration were
harvested in a manner that did not adversely affect sea turtles or in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of a nation currently certified pursuant to section
609." The declaration was to bb signed by the exporter of the shrimp and
a government official also-had -to sign attesting that the shrimp were
harvested under conditions that did not adversely affect sea turtles."8
The new guidelines did not change any of the substantive
requirements of the previous guidelines, only the area of enforcement.
56 See Revised Notice Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for
Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996).
S7 See id. at 17,343. These new guidelines provided:
Shrimp Harvested in a Manner Not Harmful to Sea Turtles. The
Department of State has determined that import prohibitions imposed
pursuant to Section 609 do not apply to shrimp or products of shrimp
harvested under the following conditions, since such harvesting does
not adversely affect sea turtles:
a. Shrimp harvested in an aquaculture facility in which the shrimp
spend at least 30 days in ponds prior to being harvested.
b. Shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp trawl vessels using TEDs
comparable in effectiveness to those required in the United States.
c. Shrimp harvested exclusively by means that do not involve the
retrieval of fishing nets by mechanical devices or by vessels using gear
that, in accordance with the U.S. program described above, would not
require TEDs.
d. Species of shrimp, such as the pandalid species, harvested in areas
in which sea turtles do not occur.
Id.
58 See id. (adding that "[t]he declaration must accompany the shipment through all states
of the export process, including in the course of any transshipments and of any
transformatiori of the original product").
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
These new guidelines were the basis of the complaint filed by India,
Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand with the WTO.
II. ISSUES BEFORE THE PANEL
A. The Complaining Parties
The complaining parties alleged that the U.S. ban on shrimp and
shrimp products imposed by section 609 and the guidelines issued
thereunder were inconsistent with the obligations of the United States
under GATT 1994,"9 particularly Articles 1:1, XI: I, and XIII:1, and that
the measure could not be justified by invocation of the exceptions set forth
in Article XX.6 The panel undertook to determine first, if the United
States violated Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 and then Articles I:1 and
XIII: 1. After finding a violation of Article XI: 1, the panel determined that
it was not necessary to inquire into whether there was also a violation of
Articles I and XIII.
1. Article I:1
Article I of GATT 1994 embodies the most favored nation
principle.6' This principle, a founding principle of the multilateral trading
system, commands that WTO Members accord any advantages, privileges
'9 See GATT, supra note 3, arts. 1:1, XI:1, XIII:1.
61 See First Submission of Thailand at 12 (May 20, 1997), Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report,
supra note 6 [hereinafter First Submission Thailand].
61 See GATT 1994, supra note 3, art. I.
General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2
and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall .be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories ofall other contracting parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
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or immunities granted to any product to the like products originating in or
destined for the territories of other WTO Members.
The arguments presented by the complaining parties under Article
I:1 were identical with those presented under Article XIII:1: shrimp
harvested with or without TEDs are "like products" (because the method
of harvest does not change the physical characteristics of shrimp), "like
products" are denied entry based on the lack of certification, "like
products" are denied entry even though harvested by use of a TED
(because the national harvesting the shrimp comes from a non-certified
nation), and a "phase-in" period of three years was provided to certain
nations while others were only given four months.62
2. Article .lI
The main argument of the complaining parties was that the
prohibition on shrimp and shrimp products violated Article XI: 1 of GATT
1994.63 In its first submission to the panel, Thailand cited the provisions
of Article XI:1 providing for the general elimination of quantitative
restrictions on imports and exports. Thailand argued that, because the
comprehensive nature of Article XI:1 required its application to all
measures instituted or maintained by a Contracting Party, its provisions
therefore prohibited outright quotas and quantitative restrictions made
effective through import or export licenses.64 Thailand maintained that the
U.S. embargo constituted a restriction on the importation of shrimp and
shrimp products from that country and was plainly not in the nature of
62 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 41.
63 See GATT, supra note 3, art. XI.
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
Id.
' See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 30. Section III of Thailand's
submission was incorporated by reference into the submissions of India and Pakistan.
See Submission of Pakistan (May 20, 1997) para. 5 [hereinafter Pakistan Submissiou].
See also First Written Submission by India (May 20, 1997) para. 5 [hereinafter India
Submission].
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"duties, taxes, or other charges" as required by Article XI:1. s Although
nations could be certified as having a program meeting the requirements of
U.S. law, that certification could be revoked at any time.66
3. Article XIII:]
The complaining parties also maintained that the U.S. ban on
shrimp and shrimp products from nations not in compliance with section
609 was inconsistent with Article XIII:I, which provides for the non-
discriminatory application of any quantitative restrictions.67 Because the
United States permitted certain countries (i.e., certified countries) to
import shrimp and shrimp products into the United States, while denying
the same privilege to other nations, the complaining countries asserted that
the U.S. ban had not been applied in a non-discriminatory manner. As a
consequence, the complaining parties argued that "like products" from
certified and non-certified countries had been treated differently, resulting
in an Article XIII:1 violation. 8
In addition, the complaining parties argued that the United States
permitted or denied entry of shrimp and shrimp products based on the
methods employed to harvest the shrimp. According to the complaining
parties, shrimp and shrimp products are "like products" despite the fact
that one nation was certified while another was not.69 The parties argued
that the method chosen to harvest the shrimp did not change the physical
characteristics, end-uses, or tariff classifications, and shrimp from non-
61 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 30.
See id. (citing the certifications of Ecuador and Colombia in support of their position).67 See id. para. 34. GAIT 1994, Article XIII:I requires the non-discriminatory
administration of quantitative restrictions.
Non-Discriminatory Administraiion of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of
any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the
importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation
of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or
restricted.
GATT, supra note 3, art. XIII: 1.68See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, paras. 35-36.
69See id. para. 36.
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certified nations are perfectly substitutable for shrimp from certified
nations."
Shrimp harvested by a national of a non-certified nation would be
denied entry into the United States, even if the shrimp were harvested by
using a TED, while shrimp harvested by a national of a certified nation in
exactly the same manner would be allowed entry into the United States.
The difference in treatment between certified and non-certified nations,
according to the complaining parties, violated Article XIII: 1.71
The complaining parties also argued that the embargo was applied
in a manner inconsistent with Article XIII: 1 because newly affected
nations were given only four months notice, while other nations had been
granted a three year phase-in period.72
4. Article XY
The complaining parties argued that the U.S. embargo, which
allegedly was inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under
GATT 1994, was not justifiable under the provisions of Article XX of
GATT 1994. Article XX provides that WTO Members may adopt and
enforce measures that are inter alia necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life, health, and conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 73 Any
measures adopted by a WTO Member must fall within one of the
70 See id. para. 35.
71 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 35.
72 See id.
71 See GATT, supra note 3, art. XX.
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
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exceptions listed in Article XX and must not run afoul of the provisions of
the introductory chapter or chapeau of the article.
The chapeau of Article XX sets out that although protection
measures may be adopted, those measures are subject to certain
conditions: "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . ." If the
measures are in line with the requirements of the chapeau, and fit within
one of the listed categories, presumably the measure will be found to be
consistent with the Members' WTO obligations.
First, the complaining parties argued that the embargo could not be
justified under Article XX(b) because the measure applied to animals not
within the jurisdiction of the United States. 4 Although the complaining
parties conceded that the language of Article XX(b) was ambiguous on
whether the animals were to be located within the jurisdiction of the
Member enacting the measure, they argued that when interpreted in light
of the general rules of international law, it should be presumed that Article
XX(b) does not extend to measures taken by one Member that affect the
life or health of human, plants and animals in the jurisdiction of another
Member, absent specific treaty language to the contrary. 75
In addition, the preparatory work and drafting history of Article
XX(b) were cited as supporting the complaining parties' position that the
Article was only intended to protect sanitary laws from a GATT
challenge.76
The complaining parties also challenged the application of Article
XX(b) based on the three prong test certain panels had developed to
determine whether a particular measure falls within the scope of measures
protected by the Article. The first prong of the test examines whether (1)
the policy in respect of the measures, for which the provision was invoked,
fell within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant
life or health; (2) the inconsistent measure for which the exception was
being invoked was necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; and (3) the measure was applied in conformity with the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.77
74See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 44.
75 See id. para. 46.76 See id.
77 See id. para. 55 (citing Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 1, at 38).
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-- According to the complaining parties, section 609 'did not fall
within the range of policies designed to protect sea turtle life or health.78
Furthermore, section 609 would not protect sea turtle life or health because
without a phase-in period, fishermen of newly affected nations with no
experience in the use of TEDs would likely be unable to use TEDs
effectively in the near term. 9
The complaining parties also asserted that the underlying purpose
of section 609 was to redress the "competitive disadvantage of U.S.
shrimp fishermen vis-&-vis foreign fishermen."80 To support this argument
the complaining countries cited certain parts of the legislative history of
section 609, where two Senators supposedly discussed the measure as
protection for U.S. fishermen.8'
In commenting on the provision, one senator
explained the embargo would mean that ". . . the price of
shrimp obviously will go up because the supply will be
down, so that Louisiana shrimpers, Texas shrimpers,
Florida shrimpers will in effect have some form of
compensation in the form of higher prices for their shrimp.
." Further, another senator stated that it was ".
patently unfair to say to the U.S. industry that you must
abide by these sets of rules and regulations, but other
countries do not have to do anything and, yet we will then
give them our market." This language, together with the
fact that Section 609 did not provide the same phase-in
period that U.S. shrimp harvesters had been granted,
indicates that the policy pursuant to which the embargo was
enacted is protection of the U.S. shrimp industry, not sea
turtles.82
78 See id. para. 56.
See id. para. 18.
80 Id.
81 See id. para. 57 (citing the debates on S. 1160, Amendment to the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, 135 CONG. REC. S8373-76 (1989) and H.R. 2991, 135 CONG. REC. S.
12266 (1989)). H.R. 2991 was part of the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 988, 1037. Thailand noted the first of these, S.1160, did not
pass but was later included as section 609 in the appropriations measure.8 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 57.
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It is interesting to note that the quote used by Thailand in its -brief
to the panel does not fully reflect the statement of Senator Johnston. In
fairness to the United States and to the Senate, upon reading the entire
quote from the September 29, 1989 Congressional Record it is quite clear
the stated intent behind the legislation was the protection of sea turtles.
What it will mean in practical terms, we think, if
those countries do not take that action the price of shrimp
obviously will go up because the supply will be down, so
that Louisiana shrimpers, Texas shrimpers, Florida
shrimpers will in effect have some form of compensation in
the form of higher prices for their shrimp should these
countries fail to take that action.
If they take the action and do those things which are
necessary to protect the sea turtles, then the purpose will
have been well achieved.
Mr. President, Senator Breaux and I have in this
amendment I think an effective protection first for sea
turtles, and alternatively help for the price of shrimp for our
shrimpers in Louisiana."
In addition, the statement of Senator Breaux quoted in the Thailand
submission is missing some important language.
The problem is even made worse by the fact that
other nations which export their shrimp products into this
country have little, if any, concern about the endangered
species, the ridley sea turtle.
What our amendment does is require our
Department of Commerce and the State Department to
survey those countries that have an impact on the ridley sea
turtle, and to ascertain whether they in fact are taking
measures to protect those endangered species, like our
shrimpers are being required to do. If they are not-and I
tell you I know for a fact they are not-and that
determination is made, we will ban the importation of tho:.,e
products into our country.
83 135 CONG. REc. S12266 (Sept. 29, 1989) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
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It is patently unfair on its face to say to the U.S.
industry that you must abide by these sets of rules and
regulations, but other countries do not have to do anything,
and yet, we will give them our market. That is exactly
what is happening .... It will require other countries to do
exactly what we are being required to do, and if in fact they
do not, they will lose the U.S. market. It is absolutely
unfair and bad policy to do anything else.
So this amendment, I think, will go a long way to
establishing a level playing field, while we work together to
try to get new rules and regulations which make sense. 4
Addressing the second prong of the test, the complaining parties
argued that the embargo was not "necessary" to fulfill the policy objective,
because the word necessary, meant that no alternative existed.85
Specifically, the complaining parties argued that the United States had not
demonstrated that alternative GATT consistent measures were not
available to it.8" In support of their argument, the complaining parties
cited language in section 609 which specifically called upon the Secretary
of State to initiate bilateral or multilateral negotiations with other nations
for the protection of sea turtles. Because the legislation contained this
language, it indicated that the embargo was not the only means by which
the goal could be accomplished.87
In addition, the complaining parties argued that the embargo was
not necessary because each of the complaining parties had an adequate
program in place for the protection of sea turtles88 and measures other than
the embargo were available to the United States.89 Because sea turtles
occur in waters within the jurisdiction of other nations, the United States
could have sought the protection of sea turtles through international
agreements, instead of unilateral import restrictions.9" Such negotiations
84Id. (statement of Sen. Breaux).
85 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 59 (quoting Tuna-Dolphin I Panel
Report, supra note 1, para. 5.35).86 See id.
87See id. para. 60.
88See id. para. 20; Pakistan Submission, supra note 64, para. 16; India Submission, supra
note 64, para. 18; First Submission of Malaysia, paras. 12-22 (June 2, 1997).
89 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 62.
9 See id.
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and possible agreements, in the complaining parties' view, would achieve
the U.S. policy goal and at the same time be consistent with the GATT.9
The next requirement, that the measure be consistent with Article
XX, could not be proved by the United States, according to the
complaining parties. In particular, the United States had the burden of
proving that the embargo was not applied in a manner which resulted in
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between WTO Members and was
not a disguised restriction on international trade.9
2
The complaining parties' basic argument for the inconsistency of
the measure with Article XX was that: (1) the newly affected countries
were given substantially less notice than other countries before being
forced to comply with the TED requirement; and (2) other nations were
given a three-year phase-in period and were allowed to continue exporting
shrimp, whereas newly affected countries were given only four months
notice before the embargo was put in place.93
Because of the different treatment, due to the time-periods
provided for compliance with the TED requirement, the embargo was
applied in a manner that resulted in arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination among nations and is a disguised restriction on trade.94 In
addition, the United States took approximately ten years to implement the
TED program for its fishermen but required the newly affected nations to
implement a program in four months, in the complaining parties' view this
fact provided proof that the embargo was arbitrary and unjustifiable.9"
With respect to Article XX(g), the complaining parties argued that
it did not apply to renewable resources. The term "exhaustible" as used in
Article XX(g), could only apply to finite resources such as minerals, not to
biological or renewable resources. 6 In defense of their argument, the
complaining parties took issue with the panel report in the Reformulated
Gasoline dispute, where the panel determined that a policy to reduce the
depletion of clean air was a "policy to conserve a natural resource within
the meaning of Article XX(g)."97 Despite having two GATT 1947 panel
9' See id.
92 See id. para. 65.
93 See id. para. 66.
" See id.
95 See id. para. 67.
96 See id. paras. 69-72.
"' See id. (citing Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 1, at 44).
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decisions, 9' the Reformulated Gasoline panel and Appellate Body
decisions go against their interpretation, the complaining parties went
further, arguing that the drafting history of Article XX(g) focused on "raw
materials" and therefore, supported their interpretation.99
The location of the natural resource or sea turtles, was also an issue
because the complaining parties did not believe that Article XX(g) could
be applied to natural resources located beyond the jurisdiction of the party
enacting the measure. Again, the complaining parties invoked the drafting
history of Article XX(g) and the ITO Charter' ° to provide support for their
argument. 101
Even if Article XX(g) did apply, the complaining parties argued
that the United States had not satisfied the requirements of Article XX(g).
According to the complaining parties, recent panel decisions (i.e.,
Reformulated Gasoline and 1994 Tuna Dolphin) suggested a four-prong
test to determine whether a party invoking Article XX(g) had met its
requirements.
The party invoking the exception must establish
that:
(1) the policy underlying the measures for which
the provision was invoked fell within the range of policies
related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources;
(2) the measures for which the exception was being
invoked were related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources;
(3) .the measures for which the exception was being
invoked were made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption; and
9 See Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Nov.
20, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (Supp. 35) para. 4.4 (1988). See generally Tuna-Dolphin I
Panel Report, supra note 1.
9 See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 72.
"00 The charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO Charter) was negotiated as
part of the Bretton Woods system to be the international organization responsible for
trade relations among the members. The U.S. Congress failed to ratify the ITO charter
and the organization never came into being. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT 1947) survived the death of the ITO.
"'t The Complaining Parties argued that the "purpose of Article XX(g) was to allow a
Contracting Party to impose limits on the exportation of scarce natural resources located
within its jurisdiction." First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, para. 74.
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(4) the measures were applied in conformity with
the requirements of the introductory clause of Article
.xX.102
The complaining parties submitted that although the general
purpose of section 609 may have been to protect sea turtles, the objective
of the embargo was not. First, the newly affected nations were only given
four months to comply with the TED requirement, and the United States
recognized that due to inexperience, foreign fishermen were unlikely to
use TEDs effectively. 3 Second, the legislative history of section 609
indicated that the purpose was to restrict imports.0 4 Third, section 609
was not specifically made an amendment to the ESA, but rather a note to
it, and it could be inferred that from this that the purpose of section 609
was something other than protection of endangered species."0 ' Fourth, the
embargo itself was not related to the conservation of sea turtles because
the embargo would only be effective if it forced other nations to change
their policies and practices, (i.e., the embargo could not conserve sea
turtles by itself).0 6 The complaining parties used the statements of the
U.S. government made in the dispute at the CIT to demonstrate that, for
newly affected nations, the embargo "would not result in any benefit to sea
turtles.' 0 7
According to the complaining parties, the real motivations behind
the embargo, were implementing judicial interpretation of U.S. law,
protecting the American shrimp industry, and placating the demands of
U.S. environmental interest groups.'08
Taken together, the foregoing factors clearly indicated, in the view
of the complaining parties, that the embargo violated the WTO obligations
of the United States under Article XI and XIII of GATT 1994 and were
not justified under Article XX.
102 See id. para. 77 (citing Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 1, at 43 and
Tuna-Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 5.32).
103 See id. para. 79.
See id.
105 See id.
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B. The United States
1. Article XX(g)
The United States argued that the embargo on imports of shrimp
and shrimp products from countries mandated by section 609 satisfied
each element of Article XX(g).0 9 According to the United States, the
embargo met these elements because: (1) sea turtles are exhaustible
natural resources; (2) section 609 as a whole relates to the conservation of
sea turtles (i.e. "there is a substantial relationship between the measure and
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource," and "the measure is
not 'merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed' at conservation"); and (3)
"section 609 is made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.." The United States invoked the Appellate
Body's opinion in the Reformulated Gasoline dispute to buttress their
position.
The Appellate Body interprets this criterion to mean
that the measures concerned impose restrictions not just on
the imported product but also with respect to the
comparable domestic product. The Appellate Body has
also stated that this requirement is one of "even-
handedness," and that there is no textual basis for identical
treatment of domestic and imported products."'
According to the United States, those tests were met. In addition,
any nation could obtain certification by simply meeting the criteria laid out
for "sea turtle safe" shrimp harvesting."2
2. The Chapeau to Article XX
Simply meeting the tests set out for Article XX(g) does not end the
inquiry even if the United States position is correct. The introductory
"o See First Submission of the United States of America, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (June 9, 1997) paras. 73-92.
0 Second Submission of the United States of America, Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report,
(July 28, 1997), para. 58 [hereinafter Second Submission U.S.].
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paragraph or "chapeau" of Article XX must also be satisfied with respect
to the provisions of section 609.'3 The United States claimed that section
609 was not applied "in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,"
because the same conditions did not prevail between the complainants and
other nations. 1 4 The United States argued that the conditions should
include those that relate to the particular policy goal of the measure."' If
this were done, the United States argued, the measure clearly fell within
the Article XX exceptions.' 16
In other words, if a measure discriminates among
countries based on conditions that are legitimately
connected with the policy of an Article XX exception, the
measure does not amount to an abuse of the applicable
Article XX exceptions.... In particular, the United States
submits that its restrictions on shrimp importation relate to
its goal of conserving endangered species of sea turtles.
Thus the relevant "conditions" in this case are those
conditions of shrimp harvesting that relate to the
conservation of sea turtles. 117
Because section 609 certified: (1) nations having shrimp fisheries
only in cold water, where there is virtually no risk of intercepting sea
turtles; (2) nations whose shrimp vessels harvest in a manner highly
unlikely to result in high turtle mortality (i.e., with small crews and
manually-retrieved nets); and (3) any nation adopting a sea turtle
conservation program comparable to the United States, it did not
3 See GATT, supra note 3, art. XX.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: ...
Id.
"' Second Submission U.S., supra note 110, para. 63 (quoting Article XX) (emphasis
omitted).
.15 See id. para. 64.
,16 See id.
"' Id. paras. 64-65.
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discriminate among nations-where the same conditions prevail." 8 Hence,
section 609 was justified because it met the criteria for Article XX(g) and
satisfied the requirements set forth in the chapeau." 9
With respect to the complaining parties' argument regarding the
timing of the U.S. measures, the United States argued that in reality, this
was a benefit not discrimination. 2 ° Because the measures under section
609 were only applied to a limited geographic area in the first three years
of application, the complaining parties were unaffected. 2' The three-year
grace period could have only benefited the complaining parties. During
this period, TEDs became "extraordinarily effective, easily available, and
inexpensive" such that the complaining parties should have adopted their
use.
122
The growing effectiveness of TEDs combined with their relatively
low cost and the increased international consensus supporting sea turtle
conservation, according to the U.S. argument, belied any claims that the
U.S. measure was a disguised restriction on trade.12 1 Hence, section 609
withstood any scrutiny under Article XX and clearly fell within the
exception provided in Article XX(g). 124
3. Article XK(b)
The United States argued that the measure could also be justified
under Article XX(b), if the panel should somehow find that Article XX(g)
was not applicable. 125 Because Article XX(b) allows for certain measures
that are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,' 2 and
section 609 was intended to protect animal life or health (i.e., the
protection of sea turtles) the measure fit within the Article XX(b)
exception.'27 The next element to be satisfied was that the measure was
118 See id. para 66.
See id. para. 69.
121 See id. para. 67.
121 See id.
122 Id. para. 67.
" See id. para. 68.
124 See id. para. 69.
125 See id.
126 GATT, supra note 3, art. XX:1(b).
127 See Second Submission U.S., supra note 110, para. 70.
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"necessary" to achieve this goal. The United States claimed that it met the
"necessary" test in two ways. 28
First, efforts to reduce sea turtle mortality are
"necessary" because, as noted, sea turtles are threatened
with extinction. Second, the United States measures under
Section 609 relating to the use of TEDs are "necessary"
because shrimp trawling without TEDs is the largest source
of human-induced sea turtle mortality.129
Hence, the United States claimed that the measure was also
justified under Article XX(b).
4. Jurisdictional Limitation to Article XX
The United States then turned to Thailand's argument concerning a
purported jurisdictional limitation to Article XX. 30 Thailand argued in its
first and second submissions to the panel that Article XX(g) did not apply
to natural resources located outside the jurisdiction of the Member
imposing the measure.'
The United States flatly rejected Thailand's arguments.3 2 Thailand
argued that the 1994 Tuna Panel Report foreclosed any territorial
limitation in Article XX(g), but left open the possibility of a jurisdictional
limitation.'33
The United States disagreed with Thailand's characterization of the
1994 Tuna panel findings and quoted the panel to make its point.
The Panel noted that two previous panels have
considered Article XX(g) to be applicable to policies
related to migratory species of fish, and had made no
distinction between fish caught within or outside the
128 See id. para. 71.
129 id.
'
3o See id. para. 74-77.
'3' See First Submission Thailand, supra note 60, paras. 45-53; Second Submission of
Thailand, paras. 41-58 (July 28, 1997); Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6,
[hereinafter Second Submission Thailand]. Thailand first argued the point with respect
to Article XX(b). See id. paras. 75-79.
'
3 2 See Second Submission U.S., supra note 110, paras. 74-77.
133 See generally Second Submission Thailand, supra note 131.
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territorial jurisdiction of the contracting party that had
invoked this provision.
The Panel then observed that measures providing
different treatment to products of different origins could in
principle be taken under other paragraphs of Article XX
and other Articles of the General Agreement with respect to
things located, or actions occurring, outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the party taking the measure. An example
was the provision in Article XX(e) relating to the products
of prison labor. It could not therefore be said that the
General Agreement proscribed in an absolute manner
measures that related to things or actions outside the
territorial jurisdiction ofthe party taking the measure.'34
In addition, the United States cited the third-party submission of
the European Communities in support of its position.'35 The EC pointed
out that "in the Tuna II panel, following extensive argument in the
question, the panel concluded that there was no valid reason for supporting
the conclusion that either Article XX(b) or (g) apply only to policies
respecting things located or actions occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of the party taking the measure."' 36
III. THE PANEL REPORT
The panel issued its report to the due parties on April 6, 1998.
Although the issues in dispute were very controversial, the underlying
concerns were quite straightforward and generally uncomplicated. 37
Essentially the issue was whether a WTO member could ban
importation of certain products in furtherance of its conservation policies
without violating its WTO obligations. 38
The panel addressed each issue raised by the parties, beginning
with a procedural or preliminary issue that caused a great deal of
controversy.
' Second Submission U.S., supra note 110, para. 75 (quoting Tuna-Dolphin II Panel
Report, supra note 1, paras. 5.15-5.16).
"' See id. para. 76.
136 Id. (quoting Third-Party Submission of the European Communities, Shrimp-Turtle
Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 9).
137 See generally Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6.
138 See id.
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A. Preliminary Issues
1. Amicus Curiae Briefs
One constant complaint, voiced by individuals and groups, about
the GATT and now the WTO, is that it operates in a non-transparent
manner.3 Panel and Appellate Body proceedings are closed to the public,
no transcripts of these proceedings are made available, and the public must
wait, sometimes for extensive periods, to have access to documents and
decisions. The Shrimp-Turtle panel report did little to change these
negative perceptions.
Two non-governmental organizations attempted to provide the
panel with amicus curia briefs. 4 ° The panel rejected these amicus briefs
because, in the words of the panel, "[a]ccepting non-requested information
from non-governmental sources would be, in our opinion, incompatible
with the provisions of the DSU as currently applied. 1 4'
Although the DSU provides panels the authority to seek
information and technical advice from any appropriate source, 41 the panel
interpreted this as not permitting information to reach the panel that the
panel did not seek. 43 Therefore, in the panel's opinion, "the initiative to
"9 See World Trade Organization: United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline: Report of the Appellate Body, Doc. I-B-77, May 20, 1996, at 25.
141 See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, paras. 7.7-7.8.
'4, Id. para. 7.8.
141 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical
advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate.
However, before a panel seeks such information or advice from any
individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform
the authorities of that Member. A Member should respond promptly
and fully to any request by a panel for such information as the panel
considers necessary and appropriate Confidential information which
is provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the
individual, body, or authorities of the Member providing the
information.
Id.
143 See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.8.
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seek information and to select the source of information rests with the
Panel.""' Consequently, the panel refused to consider the amicus briefs.'
45
The panel did point out that nothing prevented the parties from
incorporating such briefs into their submissions to the panel.'46
We observed, moreover, that it was usual practice
for parties to put forward whatever documents they
considered relevant to support their case and that, if any
party in the present dispute wanted to put forward these
documents, or parts of them, as part of their own
submissions to the Panel, they were free to do so. If this
were the case, the other parties would have two weeks to
respond to the additional material. We noted that the
United States availed themselves of this opportunity by
designating Section III of the document submitted by the
Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for
International Environmental Law as an annex to its second
submission to the Panel.
47
The panel's interpretation of Article 13 of the DSU did not find
support among NGOs nor certain parties and third-parties. The ruling on
amicus briefs did not end the controversy over participation by NGOs in
WTO dispute proceedings. If anything, the controversy over the actions of
the Shrimp-Turtle panel has brought the issue increased exposure. So
much exposure that President Clinton addressed the issue in his remarks at
the 50a' Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System, WTO Ministerial
Meeting in Geneva on May 18, 1998.48
Fourth, we must modernize the WTO by opening its
doors to the scrutiny and participation of the public.
The WTO should take every feasible step to bring





141 See President's Remarks at the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 926 (May 18, 1998).
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Today, there is no mechanism for private citizens to
provide input in these trade disputes. I propose that the
WTO provide the opportunity for stakeholders to convey
their views, such as the ability to file 'amicus briefs', to
help inform the panels in their deliberations. 49
2. Use of Experts
With respect to certain scientific and technical questions, the panel
decided to consult experts under the provisions of Article 13(1) and 13(2),
first sentence, rather than resort to an expert review group. 5 Consistent
with other WTO panels that have encountered the same situation, the panel
declined to opt for a formal expert review group advisory report.
B. Article XU:I of GATT 1994
Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 provides for the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions.' Prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges are not allowed under the provisions of Article XI.
The panel did not need to go into a lengthy inquiry over the purported
violation Article XI: 1 because the United States did not dispute that "with
respect to countries not certified under section 609, section 609 amounts to
a restriction on the importation of shrimp within the meaning of Article
149 Id. at 929.
'5' See DSU, supra note 142, arts. 13.1, 13.2. The second sentence of Article 13.2
provides:
With respect to a factual issue concerning scientific or other technical
matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory
report in writing from an expert review group. Rules for establishment
of such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.
Id. art. 13.2.
m See GATT, supra note 3, art. XI:1.
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
or any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for
export of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party.
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XI: of GATT 1994."' 152 The panel concluded with respect to this issue
that even if the U.S. statement was not an admission of an Article XI:1
violation, the evidence available to the panel was sufficient for it to
conclude that the import ban on shrimp from non-certified countries
violated Article XI: 1.
53
C. Articles XIII:1 and I:1
As addressed earlier,'54 the complaining parties claimed that the
ban on imported shrimp from non-certified nations violated Articles XIII: 1
and I:1 of GATT 1994, because of the time-periods for phase-in and
because identical products from different member nations were being
treated differently.
The panel concluded because it had already determined that the
import ban constituted a violation of Article XI:, there was no need to
reach a decision on Articles : 1 and XIII: 1.155
D. Article XX
The United States argued that the import ban adopted pursuant to
section 609 was justified under the provisions of Article XX(b) and (g).156
The dispute in essence, came down to how Article XX is to be interpreted,
and the breadth of its provisions. The complaining parties disagreed with
the United States, claiming that: (1) Article XX(b) and (g) could not be
invoked to justify a measure which applies to animals not within the
jurisdiction of the Member enacting the measure; and (2) since section 609
allowed the United States to take actions uniliterally to conserve a shared
152 Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para.7.15.
' See id. para. 7.16.
See supra notes 56-101 and accompanying text.
See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.22.
This is consistent with GATT and WTO panel practice and has been
confirmed by the Appellate Body in the Wool Shirts case, where the
Appellate Body mentioned that "A panel need only address those
claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue
in the dispute."
Id.
156 See Second Submission U.S., supra note 110, at 32.
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natural resource, it therefore violated the sovereignty principle under
international law.
5 7
In response to the arguments of the complaining parties, the United
States argued that: (1) Article XX (b) and (g) contain no jurisdictional
limitation, nor limitations on the location of the animals or natural
resources to be protected and conserved; and (2) under principles of
international law relating to sovereignty, States have the right to regulate
imports within their jurisdiction." 8
From the above arguments the panel framed the issue as, "whether
Article XX(b) and (g) apply at all when a Member has taken a measure
conditioning access to its market for a given product on the adoption of
certain conservation policies by the exporting Member(s)."'59 The framing
of the issue in this manner did not bode well for the United States. The
panel did, however, go on to state that Article XX can be interpreted
broadly.16
We note that Article XX can accommodate a broad
range of measures aiming at the conservation and
preservation of the environment. At the same time, by
accepting the WTO Agreement, Members commit
themselves to certain obligations which limit their right to
adopt certain measures whereby a Member conditions
access to its market for a given product on the adoption of
certain conservation policies by the exporting
Member(s). 6
The tension as expressed by the panel in the quote above between
the Members WTO obligations on the one hand, and Members efforts to
protect the environment and endangered species on the other, provides the
most contentious issue in this dispute.
The panel determined that, in order to interpret whether a measure
was justified under Article XX, it had to first determine the scope of
Article XX by considering its terms in their ordinary meaning and in their
1-5 See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.24.
15 8 See id.
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- context taking into account the object and purpose of GATT 1994 and the
WTO Agreement.1
6
In order to interpret whether a particular measure is justified under
a provision or the provisions of Article XX, the measure must fit within
the scope of the provision invoked and must also be consistent with the




Subject to the requirement that such measures are
not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures: .... 164
Rather than analyze the measures under the specific provisions of
Article XX and then determine if those measures were consistent with the
chapeau, the panel first examined the measures in light of the chapeau . 6,
In the opinion of the panel, the chapeau by its terms, "addresses, not so
much the questioned measure or its specific contents, but rather the
manner in which that measure is applied.' ' 166 Because the United States
was claiming an exception under Article XX, and because Article XX is
considered an affirmative defense, the panel determined that the burden
was on the United States to prove that the measure was justified under the
provisions of Article XX
16 7
The panel laid out the manner in which it would interpret Article
XX: 16
8
In order to apply Article XX in this case, we must,
as mentioned in paragraph 7.27 above, interpret it in line
with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. More
particularly, the chapeau of Article XX must be interpreted
162See id. para. 7.27.
163See GATT, supra note 3, art. XX.
16 Id.
165 See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.28.
'66 See id. para. 7.29.
167 See id. para. 7.30.
168 See id. para. 7.33.
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on the basis of the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their
context and in the light of the object and purpose of GATT
1994 and the WTO Agreement. We consider first if the
terms of the chapeau of Article XX explicitly address the
issue of whether Article XX contains any limitation on a
Member's use of measures conditioning market access to
the adoption of certain conservation policies by the
exporting Member. In this connection, we note that the
chapeau prohibits such application of the measure as would
constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
between countries where the same conditions prevail. 169
The panel first determined that shrimp from certified nations and
shrimp from non-certified nations were treated differently (i.e., shrimp
from non-certified nations were discriminated against by virtue of the
provisions of section 609). Although Article XX allows for discriminatory
treatment under certain conditions, the manner of the discrimination must
not be arbitrary or unjustifiable. The panel proceeded to determine
whether the U.S. measure was unjustifiable: 70
As was recalled by the Appellate Body in the
Gasoline case, "the text of the chapeau of Article XX is not
without ambiguity." The word "unjustifiable" has never
actually been subject to any precise interpretation. The
ordinary meaning of this term is susceptible to both narrow
and broad interpretations. While the ordinary meaning of
"unjustifiable" confirms that Article XX is to be applied
within certain boundaries, it does not explicitly address the
issue of whether Article XX should be interpreted to
contain any limitation on a Member's use of measures
conditioning market access on the adoption of certain
conservation policies by the exporting Member. For that
reason, it is essential that we interpret the term
"unjustifiable" within its context and in the light of the
object and purpose of the agreement to which it belongs.'
169 id.
170 See id. para. 7.34.
171 Id.
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The panel considered that the context and the object and purpose of
the WTO Agreement were "intimately linked.' ', 72  For this reason, the
panel determined that the chapeau to Article XX could not be
distinguished from Article XX as a whole, and that because the WTO
Agreement is an integrated system, it must consider not only the relevant
provisions of GATT 1994, but of the WTO Agreement as a whole. 73
In reviewing past GATT 1947 panel decisions 74 and a WTO
Appellate Body decision, the panel determined that the provisions of
Article XX are to be interpreted narrowly. 175 The panel looked to the
Appellate Body decision in the Reformulated Gasoline dispute, where the
Appellate Body concluded that there were certain limits and conditions on
the provisions of Article XX.176
[W]hile the exceptions of Article XX may be
invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so
applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the
holder of the right under the substantive rules of the
General Agreement. If those exceptions [contained in
Article XX] are not to be abused or misused, in other
words; the measures falling within the particular exceptions
must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the
legal duties of the party claiming the exception- and the
legal rights of the other parties concerned. 77
Based on its reading of the above-quoted language and its
interpretation of Article XX, the panel concluded that when Members
invoke the right to derogate from certain of their obligations under the
WTO Agreement by virtue of Article XX, they must not do so in a manner
that frustrates or defeats the "purposes and objects of the General
Agreement and the WTO Agreement ... ,78 In addition, the panel
172 See id. para. 7.35.
173 See id.
'" See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 1; United States Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36' Supp.) at 345 (1989); United
States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India,
WT/DS33/R (Jan. 6, 1997).
.
75 See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, paras. 7.36-7.38.
176 See id. paras. 7.34-7.39.
7 Id. (quoting the Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 1, at 22).
'
78 Id. para. 7.40 (footnote omitted).
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recalled the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda (i.e., that
treaties are to be performed in good faith) and the explanation of this
principle contained in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, as further
support for its conclusion.'
The next task for tne panel was to determine the object and purpose
of the WTO Agreement. Although the preamble of the WTO Agreement
contains language which discusses the "optimal" use of the world's
resources, the panel concluded that the central focus of the WTO
Agreement was the promotion of economic development through trade.'80
While the WTO - Preamble confirms that
environmental considerations are important for the
interpretation of the WTO Agreement, the central focus of
that agreement remains the promotion of economic
development through trade; and the provisions of GATT
are essentially turned toward liberalization of access to
markets on a nondiscriminatory basis. 8'
The WTO Agreement, in the panel's view, favors a multilateral
approach to trade issues. Therefore, WTO Members are only allowed to
derogate from the provisions of GATT so long as they do not undermine
the multilateral trading system.18 2
We are of the view that a type of measure adopted
by a Member which, on its own, may appear to have a
relatively minor impact on the multilateral trading system,
may nonetheless raise a serious threat to that system if
similar measures are adopted by the same or other
Members. Thus, by allowing such type of measures even
though their individual impact may not appear to be such as
to threaten the multilateral trading system, one would affect
the security and predictability of the multilateral trading
system. We consequently find that when considering a
measure under Article XX, we must determine not only
179 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "[e]very treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."0 See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 7.42.
181 Id.
182 See id. para. 7.44.
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whether -the measure on its own undermines the WTO
multilateral trading system, but also whether such type of
measure, if it were to be adopted by other Members, would
threaten the security and predictability of the multilateral
trading system.'83
The "threat to the multilateral trading system" standard is a new
one for Article XX. The panel concluded that allowing a broad
interpretation of the chapeau to Article XX would permit a Member to
condition access to its markets upon the adoption by other "[m]embers of
certain policies, including conservation policies."'8 4 The ultimate danger
in the opinion of the panel was that Members would adopt differing
standards for products such that "[m]arket access for goods could become
subject to an increasing number of conflicting policy requirements ...
[and this would result in] the end of the WTO multilateral trading
system."'85
This approach to interpreting Article XX (i.e., first interpreting the
measure in light of the chapeau) is quite different from the approach taken
by other GATT 1947 panels and the Appellate Body in the Reformulated
Gasoline dispute.'86 Past panels first attempted to determine if the measure
fit within one of the exceptions and then determined if the measure was
applied in a non-discriminatory manner as required by the chapeau to
Article XX.'87
Based on its finding that the U.S. measures conditioned access to
the U.S. market on whether other WTO Members adopted certain
conservation policies, the panel concluded that the U.S. measures under
section 609 "constitut[ed] unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail [and were therefore] not within the
scope of measures [covered by] Article XX."' 88 In addition, the panel
concluded that although WTO Members are free to have environmental
and endangered species protection policies, such policies must not
endanger the multilateral trading system.'89
183 Id.
,' Id. para. 7.45.
185 Id.
' See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 1.
18 7 See id.
188 Id. para. 7.49.
189 See id. para. 9.1.
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"Members are free to set their own environmental objectives.
However, they are bound to implement these objectives in such a way that
is consistent with their WTO obligations, not depriving the WTO
Agreement of its object and purpose."'"9
Based on the panel's analysis of Article XX, it is difficult to
fathom what type of measure would not be a "threat to the multilateral
trading system." It would seem that any time a Member restricts access to
its market, even if the measure employed fits within the type of measures
listed in Article XX, that this action would threaten the multilateral trading
system. As stated in the report, the panel feared that a particular measure,
even though it may not affect a significant amount of trade, could be a
threat to the multilateral system if other Members were free to adopt
policies similarly restricting access to their markets. 9 '
E. The Differing Interpretations of Article XX. Are There Any
Environmental Exceptions That Do Not "Threaten the Multilateral
Trading System?"
As stated earlier, the panel report seems to set a new and higher
standard for imposition of measures pursuant to Article XX exceptions.
The interpretation that the chapeau to Article XX contains a "threat to the
multilateral trading system" standard is hard to reconcile with the
language of Article XX.
After the Appellate Body issued its report in the Reformulated
Gasoline dispute, the issue of Article XX exceptions and the analysis to be
employed when dealing with such exceptions was thought to be somewhat
resolved.'92 The Appellate Body, in Reformulated Gasoline, rejected the
'g Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 9.1.
'9, See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 112. The panel states:
[B]y allowing such type of measures even though their individual
impact may not appear to be such as to threaten the mulitlateral trading
system, one would affect the security and predictability of the
multilateral trading system. We consequently find that ... we must
determine not only whether the measure on its own undermines the
WTO multilateral trading system, but also whether such type of
measure, if it were to be adopted by other Members, would threaten the
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.
Id. (emphasis in original).
192 See id.
[I]f an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be followed
which would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning access
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panel's legal conclusion that the baseline establishment rules did not fall
within the terms of Article XX(g) because "the Panel Report failed to take
adequate account of the words actually used by Article XX in its several
paragraphs.' 93
It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the
WTO Members intended to require, in respect of each and
every category, the same kind or degree of connection or
relationship between the measure under appraisal and the
state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized...
The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of
the rest of the General Agreement, including in particular
Articles I, III, and XI; conversely the context of Articles I
and III and XI includes Article XX. Accordingly, the
phrase "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources" may not be read so expansively as seriously to
subvert the purpose and object of Article 11:4. Nor may
Article II1:4 be given so broad a reach as effectively to
emasculate Article XX(g) and the policies and interests it
embodies. The relationship between the affirmative
commitments set out in, e.g., Articles I, III and XI, and the
policies and interests embodied in the "General
Exceptions" listed in Article XX, can be given meaning
within the framework of the General Agreement and its
object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a case-to-
case basis, by careful scrutiny of the factual and legal
context in a given dispute, without disregarding the words
actually used by the WTO Members themselves to express
their intent and purpose.194
This interpretation of Article XX is in stark contrast to the panel's
interpretation of Article XX in the Shrimp-Turtle report. Not only did the
to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the exporting
Members of certain policies, including conservation policies, GATT
1994 and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral
framework for trade among Members as security and predictability of
trade relations under those agreements would be threatened.
Id. para 7.45 (emphasis in original).
193 Id. para. 6.40.
194 Id. paras. 6.25-6.28.
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panel seem to ignore the words actually used, it added a new requirement
that does not appear in the text at all. 9
The Appellate Body, in the Reformulated Gasoline Report,
determined that the interests embodied in Article XX had to be balanced
with the obligations contained in other articles. 96 The Shrimp-Turtle
panel, however, ignores the type of balancing test the Appellate Body
suggested in Reformulated Gasoline Report and instead shifts the balance
in favor of trade over the environment or endangered species.
Under the Shrimp-Turtle panel's application of the "threat to the
multilateral trading system standard," the trading system would be
threatened anytime a WTO Member blocked or put any type of conditions
on access to its market. Hence, the exceptions contained in Article XX
would be rendered useless, despite the fact that the Members agreed on
their inclusion in the General Agreement and on the language used. It
would be difficult to imagine an instance where a measure that fell within
an Article XX exception would not cause a threat to the multilateral
trading system, under the standard employed by the Shrimp-Turtle panel.
The panel's interpretation of the chapeau to Article XX in the Shrimp-
Turtle report does not seem compatible with the language in Article XX
and the purpose of the WTO Agreement.
The panel's legal findings and conclusions in the Shrimp-Turtle
report are hard to reconcile with the actions of WTO Members at the end
of the Uruguay Round. There are several multilateral environmental
agreements and agreements to protect endangered species. In each case,
the signatories have undertaken obligations to protect and preserve the
environment, endangered species, or in some cases, both. 97
F. Conclusion
The tension between efforts to strengthen the multilateral trading
system through continued liberalization and the efforts to protect the
environment and endangered species is made more intense by the panel
ruling in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute.
'95 See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
196 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, at 14.
" See, e.g., Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, concluded at Ramsar, Iran, on Feb. 2, 1971; Convention on the
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (with appendices), concluded at
Bern on Sept. 19, 1979; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (with appendices and Final Act of Mar. 2, 1973).
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The panel's admonition to the United States that it should embark
on multilateral negotiations to address issues like the preservation of sea
turtles rather than taking unilateral action seems to set a new and higher
standard for measures intended to protect the environment. If WTO
Members have to embark on multilateral negotiations as a prerequisite for
employing measures that are clearly anticipated in Article XX, then the
likelihood of any measure being found to be consistent with the provisions
of Article XX decreases dramatically.
IV. REACTION TO THE PANEL REPORT
As was expected, the reaction to the panel report was not positive.
On the day the report was released environmental and conservationist
groups held a press conference to blast the report and the WTO.'98
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) released a
statement that it was disappointed with the ruling.'99 There was an
unexpectedly muted reaction by Members of Congress. Although
obviously disappointed by the ruling, the type of outrage expressed by the
environmentalists was not echoed by the Executive Branch or Members of
Congress, evidenced by a lack of response in the press.
V. THE APPEAL BY THE UNITED STATES
On July 13, 1998 the United States communicated its notice of
appeal to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).2°0 The United States
asked the Appellate Body to review the panels finding that the measure at
issue was not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of
Article XX.20 In addition, the United States appealed the panel's rejection
of information from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) °
' See, e.g., Press Conference of National Wildlife Federation, Center for Marine
Conservation, World Wildlife Fund, Defenders of Wildlife, and Center for International
Environmental Law (CSPAN television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1998).
"" See USTR Barshefsky Responds to WTO Shrimp-Turtle Report, USTR Press Release,
98-40 (Apr. 6, 1998).
200 United States, Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Notification of an Appeal by the United States under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
WT/DS58/11 (July 13, 1998).
201 See id.
202 See id.
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The United States submitted its brief to the Appellate Body on July
23, 1998.203 The United States took issue not only with the panel's finding
that the provisions of section 609 were outside the scope of Article XX,
but also with its interpretation of the object and purpose of the WTO
Agreement and the adoption of the "threat to the multilateral trading
system" analysis.2 4 The final point addressed in the U.S. submission was
the panel's rejection of the briefs from non-governmental organizations.0 5
In its appellate submission, the United States argued that the
panel's finding that the measure at issue was outside the scope of Article
XX was based upon its failure to apply the ordinary meaning of the phrase
"a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail. 20 6 The United States further argued
that the panel interpreted this phrase as "requiring panels to determine
whether [such] a measure constitutes a threat to the multilateral trading
system" and that "[t]his interpretation.. .ha[d] no basis in the text of the
GATT [and]... [ha[d]] never been adopted by any prior panel or Appellate
Body. . .27 In addition, the United States argued that such an
interpretation "would impermissibly diminish the rights that WTO
Members reserved under Article XX." 208
The United States argued that with respect to the panel's
interpretation of Article XX, it incorrectly applied the object and purpose
of the WTO Agreement.0 9
The Panel's description of the GATT's overall
object and purpose is both vastly oversimplified, and not
helpful in interpreting Article XX, which explicitly allows
for measures that result in discriminatory market access.
Like the panel in [Reformulated Gasoline Report], the
panel here has "ignore[d] the fact that Article XX of the
General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit
important state interests-including the protection of
203 See Submission of the United States (Appellant), United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4 (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.
Appellate Submission].214 See id. para. 49.
205 See id. para. 28.
206 Id. para. 21.
207 Id. para. 22.
208 Id. para. 22.
209 See id. para. 32.
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human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources-to find expression."2 '
The United States argued that the panel erred when it determined
that because the GATT is a trade agreement, it would necessarily follow
that trade concerns must prevail over all other concerns in all situations
where the measures affected obligations under GATT."' In the view of
the United States, the WTO Agreement is a far-reaching agreement, one
that has more than a single object and purpose.212 In fact, the preamble to
the WTO Agreement contains explicit language that addresses
environmental concerns within the context of trade.213
Further, the United States rejected the panel's "threat to the
multilateral trading system"1 4 analysis because, among other reasons, this
analysis: (1) "assumes that the complaining parties had an expectation
that the General Exceptions in Article XX would never be invoked by
another WTO Member"; 2 5 (2) "the Appellate Body explicitly disapproved
of panels using 'expectations' as a basis for interpreting the WTO
Agreement;" '216 (3) [t]he expectations of the [p]arties are reflected in the
2"' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report,
supra note 1, para. 32).
2. See id. para. 33.
212 See id. para. 34.
213 See id. The first clause of the Preamble to the WTO Agreement states:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the .field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels
of economic development....
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) (emphasis in original).
214 U.S. Appellate Submission, supra note 203, para. 45.
215 Id. para. 37.
216 Id. (citing India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS50/R, para. 7.18 (Sept. 5, 1997)).
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language of Article XX itself'; 2'7 and (4) "the [p]anel made -no findings
that the U.S. measure amounted to any sort of disguised restriction. 2 8
Although it disagreed with the panel's analysis and stated that the
"threat to the multilateral trading system" analysis should be disregarded,
the United States claimed that even under that analysis, the measure did
not threaten the multilateral trading system.2 9 The Appellate Body agreed,
finding that the U.S. measure was not an actual threat to the multilateral
trading system. 2
0
The threat to the multilateral trading system analysis, according to
the U.S. argument, is not found in the text of the WTO Agreement and
thus adds a new obligation to Article XX. 22 ' The addition of this new
obligation runs counter to the explicit provisions of Article 3.2 of the DSU
which provides, "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements. 222 In adopting the threat to the multilateral trading system
analysis, the panel exceeded the authority provided to it under the DSU.
In addition, the United States argued that the measure reasonably
differentiates between countries based on the risk posed to endangered sea
turtles by countries' shrimp trawling industries, and the measure did not
amount to unjustifiable discrimination.223
The last issue addressed by the United States was the panel's
decision not to consider the submissions from non-governmental
organizations.224 Contrary to the findings of the panel, the United States
argued that nothing in the DSU prohibited a panel from considering
unsolicited information . 25 According to the United States, Article 13 of
the DSU provides the panel with broad authority and allows it "discretion
in choosing its sources of information." 226
Ultimately, the United States asked the Appellate Body to reverse
the findings of the panel because if the findings were upheld, they would
2" Id. para. 39
211 Id. para. 40.
2 9 See id. para. 42.
220 See id. para. 47.
221 See id. para. 48.
22 2 Id. para. 50 (quoting DSU, supra note 142, art. 3.2).
221 See id. para. 61.
224 See U.S. Appellate Submission, supra note 203, para. 66.
225 See id.
226 Id. para. 67.
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"impermissibly change the basic terms of the bargain agreed to by WTO
Members in agreeing to the GATT 1994. "227
VI. THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT
On October 12, 1998, the Appellate Body issued its report in the
Shrimp-Turtle dispute. 28  The United States appealed two issues, the
rejection by the panel of non-requested submissions by non-governmental
organizations and the panel's interpretation of Article XX of GATT
1994.229
The first issue the Appellate Body addressed was -the finding by the
panel that acceptance of "non-requested information from non-
governmental sources would be incompatible with the provisions of the
DSU as currently applied. '230 Although the Appellate Body agreed with
the panel that WTO dispute settlement is limited to Members of the WTO,
and only those Members who are parties to the dispute or are third-parties
have a legal right to submit information, the Appellate Body disagreed
with the panel's interpretation of the provisions of Article 13.2 of the
DSU.
Article 13 of the DSU provides panels the authority to seek
information:
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek
information and technical advice from any individual or
body that it deems appropriate. However, before a panel
seeks such information or advice from any individual or
body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the
authorities of that Member. A Member should respond
promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such
information as the panel considers necessary and
appropriate. Confidential information which is provided
shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the
"7Id. para. 73.
228 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report].
229 See United States, Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Notification of an Appeal by the United States under paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
WT/DS58/11 (July 13, 1998).
"
0 See id. para. 98.
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individual, body, or authorities of the Member providing
the information.
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant
source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on
certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue
concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a
party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in
writing from an expert review group. Rules for the
establishment of such a group and its procedures are set
forth in Appendix 4.131
Based on the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 13, panels
are provided comprehensive authority to seek information and technical
advice. 2  This authority, in the view of the Appellate Body, "is not
properly equated with a prohibition on accepting information which has
been submitted without having been requested by a panel." 33
A panel has the discretionary authority either to
accept and consider or to reject information and advice
submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not. The
fact that a panel may motu proprio have initiated the
request for information does not, by itself, bind the panel to
accept and consider the information which is actually
submitted. The amplitude of the authority vested in panels
to shape the processes of fact-finding and legal
interpretation makes clear that a panel will not be deluged,
as it were, with non-requested material, unless that panel
allows itself to be so deluged.234
Hence, according to the Appellate Body, the panel's legal
interpretation that accepting non-requested information would be
incompatible with the provisions of the DSU was in error.
The next issue addressed by the Appellate Body was the panel's
interpretation of Article XX and the finding that section 609 was not
within the scope of Article XX's exceptions.
23' DSU, supra note 6, art. 13.
232 See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 228, para. 107.
231 Id. para. 108.
14 See id. (emphasis in-original).
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The Appellate Body reviewed the panel's Article XX analysis and
found that it did not follow "all of the steps of applying the 'customary
rules of interpretation of public international law' as required by Article
3.2 of the DSU.' 35 First, the Appellate Body found that the panel did not
"expressly examine the ordinary meaning of the words of Article XX.'' 236
The Panel disregarded the fact that the introductory
clauses of Article XX speak of the "manner" in which
measures sought to be justified are "applied." In United
States-Gasoline, we pointed out that the chapeau of
Article XX "by its express terms addresses, not so much the
questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but
rather the manner in which that measure is applied." The
Panel did not inquire specifically into how the application
of Section 609 constitutes "a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade." What the Panel did, in purporting to
examine the consistency of the measure with the chapeau of
Article XX, was to focus repeatedly on the design of the
measure itself.
The general design of a measure, as distinguished from its
application, is, however, to be examined in the course of
determining whether that measure falls within one or
another of the paragraphs of Article XX following the
chapeau. The Panel failed to scrutinize the immediate
context of the chapeau: i.e., paragraphs (a) to () of Article
XX. Moreover, the Panel did not look into the object and
purpose of the chapeau of Article XX Rather, the Panel
looked into the object and purpose of the whole of the
GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, which object and
purpose it described in an overly broad manner."7
The Appellate Body disagreed with the sequence of the Panel's
analysis under Article XX. The Appellate Body argued that the structure
I" d. para. 114.
I36 d. para. 115.
237Id. paras. 115-16 (emphasis in original).
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and the logic of Article XX dictates that a measure is to be first analyzed
under the paragraphs of Article XX and then under the provisions of the
chapeau."
The task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent
the abuse or misuse of the specific exemptions provided for
in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if indeed it remains
possible at all, where the interpreter (like the Panel in this
case) has not first identified and examined the specific
exception threatened with abuse. The standards established
in the chapeau are, moreover, necessarily broad in scope
and reach: the prohibition of the application of a measure
"in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail" or "a disguised restriction on
international trade." When applied in a particular case, the
actual contours and contents of these standards will vary as
the kind of measure under examination varies. What is
appropriately characterizable as "arbitrary discrimination"
or "unjustifiable discrimination", or as a "disguised
restriction on international trade" in respect of one category
of measures, need not be so with respect to another group
or type of measures. The standard of "arbitrary
discrimination," for example, under the chapeau may be
different for a measure that purports to be necessary to
protect public morals than for one relating to the products
of prison labour.23 9
The Appellate Body concluded that the panel's interpretative
analysis, embodied in its findings, constituted legal error and thus reversed
those findings .24  The Appellate Body then had to complete the legal
analysis left unfinished by the panel to determine if the U.S. measure was
within the scope of measures encompassed by Article XX.241 In at least
two other disputes the Appellate Body had to undertake to complete a
legal analysis left incomplete due to errors by the panels.242
38 See id. paras. 118-19.
2 Id. para. 120 (emphasis added).240 See id. para. 122.
241 See id. para. 123.
242 See id. para. 124 (citing European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation
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The Appellate Body had to determine two things: first, whether
under its Article XX analysis, the U.S. measure fit under Article XX(g);
and second, whether section 609 was a measure relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources within the meaning of
Article XX(g).2 43
The panel, because it began with the chapeau rather than the
specific provision of Article XX, did not complete the analysis to
determine if section 609 fit within the scope of measures covered by
Article XX(g).
The Appellate Body, upon review of the arguments made by the
parties,244 determined that Article XX(g) was not limited to the
conservation of mineral or non-living resources:
The complainants' principal argument is rooted in
the notion that "living" natural resources are "renewable"
and therefore cannot be "exhaustible" natural resources.
We do not believe that "exhaustible" natural resources and
"renewable" natural resources are mutually exclusive. One
lesson that modem biological sciences teach us is that
living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction
and, in that sense, "renewable," are in certain circumstances
indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction,
frequently because of human activities. Living resources
of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) para. 5, and Canada-
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS3 I/AB/R (July 30, 1997) at 23-24).
As in those previous cases, we believe it is our responsibility
here to examine the claim by the United States for justification of
Section 609 under Article XX in order properly to resolve this dispute
between the parties. We do this, in part, recognizing that Article 3.7 of
the DSU emphasizes that: "The aim of the dispute settlement
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute." Fortunately,
in the present case, as in the mentioned previous cases, we believe that
the facts on the record of the panel proceedings permit us to undertake
the completion of the analysis required to resolve this dispute.
Id.
43 Id. Article XX(g) provides, in part "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption." GATT 1994, supra note 3, art. XX(g).
24 See supra notes 59-105 and accompanying text.
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are just as "finite" as petroleum, iron ore and other non-
living resources.24
The next issue the Appellate Body reviewed was whether section
609 was a measure related to the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource. 46 First, the Appellate Body noted that the policy of protecting
and conserving endangered sea turtles was one that was shared by all
participants to the dispute and thus constituted a legitimate conservation
policy. 47 Second, the Appellate Body inquired into the relationship
between the general structure and design of section 609 and the policy
goal of preserving sea turtles: 2 48
In its general design and structure, therefore,
Section 609 is not a simple, blanket prohibition of the
importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the
consequences (or lack thereof) of the mode of harvesting
employed upon the incidental capture and mortality of sea
turtles. Focusing on the design of the measure here at
stake, it appears to us that Section 609, cum implementing
guidelines, is not disproportionately wide in its scope and
reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and
conservation of sea turtle species. The means are, in
principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and
ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate
policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact,
endangered species, is observably a close and real one, a
relationship that is every bit as substantial as that which we
found in United States-Gasoline between the EPA baseline
establishment rules and the conservation of clean air in the
United States. 49
Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Body concluded that section
609 was a measure "'relating to' the conservation of an exhaustible natural
245 Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 228, para. 128.
246 See id. para. 135.
247 See id.
248 See id. para. 137.
249 Id. para. 141 (footnote omitted).
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resource within the meaning of Article XX(g) of GATT 1994.25°
The next issue for the Appellate Body was whether section 609
was made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.2 5' In essence, in order to satisfy the provisions
of Article XX(g), the restrictions imposed on imports of foreign shrimp
(i.e., that it be caught in a sea-turtle safe manner) also must be imposed on
domestically caught shrimp. 52 Upon review of section 609 and the
accompanying regulations, the Appellate Body concluded the provisions
of section 609 were "even-handed" in nature and were made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic harvesting of shrimp.2 53
After the Appellate Body determined that the provisions of section
609 satisfied the requirements of Article XX(g), it then turned to the
question of whether the measure complied with the provisions of the
chapeau of Article XX.2-1 In particular, the Appellate Body had the "task
of appraising Section 609, and specifically the manner in which it is
applied under the chapeau of Article XX; that is, the second part of the
two-tier analysis required under Article XX.''" s
According to the Appellate Body's interpretation of the chapeau,
the exceptions contained in the paragraphs following the chapeau, are
limited and conditional with respect to the substantive obligations found in
the other sections of GATT 1994.6 This interpretation was bolstered by
250 Id.
251 See id. para. 54.
252 Paragraph (g) of Article XX covers measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT 1994, supra note 3, art.
XX(g). See id. para. 126.
253 See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 228, paras. 144-45. The
Appellate Body noted the penalties imposed on domestic shrimp operations for failure to
comply with the provisions of section 609 and the regulations. See id.
254 See id. para. 147. The chapeau of Article XX of GATT 1994 puts certain
requirements on measures imposed under other provisions of the article:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any Member of measures: ...
GAT 1994, supra note 3, art. XX.
55 Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 228, para. 147.
256 See id. para. 157.
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the negotiating history of that provision."7 In addition, the interpretation
and application of the chapeau, in the opinion of the Appellate Body
requires a delicate balancing act. 8
The Appellate Body looked to the language of the chapeau of
Article XX and analyzed section 609 to determine whether the measure
ran afoul of its requirements. In order to comply with the chapeau, section
609 must not constitute "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" or be
"a disguised restriction on international trade. 2 9
A. Unjustifiable Discrimination
The first step in the Appellate Body's analysis was to determine if
section 609 constituted a means of unjustifiable discrimination.2 60  The
Appellate Body focused on the application of section 609, consistent with
its understanding of the correct way to analyze a measure under the
chapeau.
Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this
measure's application relates to its intended and actual
coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by
foreign governments, Members of the WTO. Section 609,
in its application is, in effect, an economic embargo which
requires all other exporting Members, if they wish to
exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same
policy (together with an approved enforcement program) as
257 See id.
258 See id. para. 159.
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence,
essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of
equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception
under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying
substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that
neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby
distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations
constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement.
Id.
259 See id. para. 160.
260 See id. para. 161.
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that applied to, and enforced on, United States domestic
shrimp trawlers.26" '
The Appellate Body found that this fact combined with the
inflexible nature of the 1996 Guidelines essentially created the situation in
which foreign nations were forced to adopt a regulatory program identical
to the one adopted by the United States.262 Although the Appellate Body
recognized that it was entirely appropriate for the United States to apply a
uniform standard throughout its territory, this was not acceptable
procedure in international trade relations. 63 The flaw in the application of
the measure was the failure of the United States to "tak[e] into
consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of
those other Members."26
This suggests to us that this measure, in its
application, is more concerned with effectively influencing
WTO Members to adopt essentially the same
comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the
United States to its domestic shrimp trawlers even though
many of those Members may be differently situated. We
believe that discrimination results not only when countries
in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated,
but also when the application of the measure at issue does
not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the
regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those
exporting countries. 265
Another factor, decidedly not in favor of the United States was its
failure to engage in negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral
or multilateral agreements, prior to enactment of section 609. To make
matters worse, the Appellate Body noted that Congress in passing section
609 gave explicit instructions to the Secretary of State to initiate
negotiations for the development of bilateral or multilateral agreements.2 6
261 Id. para. 161 (emphasis in original).
262 See id. para. 163.
263 See id. para. 164.
264 Id. para. 165.
265 Id.
266 See id. para. 167.
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Despite the clear language of Congress only one multilateral agreement for
the protection of sea turtles was concluded.267
In addition, the Appellate Body pointed out that the protection of
sea turtles, a highly migratory species, "demands concerted and
cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries whose waters are
traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations. '"268
The Inter-American Convention, in the Appellate Body's opinion,
demonstrated "the conviction of its signatories, including the United
States, that consensual and multilateral procedures are available and
feasible for the establishment of programs for the conservation of sea
turtles."269
Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions, and on the length of
the phase-in periods, the Appellate Body determined that section 609
constituted unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau
to Article XX 27 0
B. Arbitrary Discrimination
The next issue for the Appellate Body was whether section 609
was applied in a manner that constituted arbitrary discrimination.27 ' The
Appellate Body found that the certification requirements and procedures
did, in fact, constitute arbitrary discrimination. First, the Appellate
Body noted that section 609 "imposes a single, rigid and unbending
requirement that countries applying for certification under Section
609(b)(2)(A) and (B) adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is
essentially the same as the United States' program .... "273 In addition, the
lack of flexibility in determining whether to certify nations troubled the
Appellate Body.2 4 The certification determinations, in the Appellate
Body's opinion, were not made in a transparent or predictable manner."7
267 See id. See also Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of
Sea Turtles, First Written Submission of the United States to the Panel, Exhibit AA of
Appellate Body Report, supra note 221.
268 Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 228, para. 168.
169 Id. para. 170.
270 See id. para. 176.
271 See id. para. 177.
272 See id. para. 184.
273 Id. para. 177.
274 See id.
275 See id. para. 180:
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The fact that no formal written decision was provided to the applicant
countries troubled the Appellate Body. 76
The Appellate Body determined that the provisions of Article X:3
of GATT 1994277 had to be taken into account.278
Inasmuch as there are due process requirements
generally for measures that are otherwise imposed in
compliance with WTO obligations, it is only reasonable
that rigorous compliance with the fundamental
requirements of due process should be required in the
application and administration of a measure which purports
to be an exception to the treaty obligations of the Member
imposing the measure and which effectively results in a
suspension pro hac vice of the treaty rights of other
Members.
It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT
1994 establishes certain minimum standards for
transparency and procedural fairness in the administration
of trade regulations which, in our view, are not met here. 79
The certification processes under Section 609 consist principally of
administrative ex parte inquiry or verification by staff of the Office of
Marine Conservation in the Department of State with staff of the
United States National Marine Fisheries Service. With respect to both
types of certification, there is no formal opportunity for an applicant
country to be heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made
against it, in the course of the certification process before a decision to
grant or deny certification is made.
Id. (footnote omitted).
276 See id.
277 See id. para. 182. Article X:3 states in part:
(a) Each Member shall administer in a uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings
of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(b) Each Member shall maintain, or institute as soon as
practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures
for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of
administrative action relating to customs matters.
GATr 1994, supra note 3, art. X:3.278 See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 228, para. 182.
279 Id. paras. 182-83.
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The Appellate Body concluded that the measure, section 609,
amounted to unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail and, hence, was contrary to the
provisions of the chapeau.28 0 The measure, therefore, could not be justified
under the provisions of Article XX of GATT 1994. Due to this finding the
Appellate Body determined that a finding on the issue of whether the
measure was a "disguised restriction on international trade" was not
necessary. 28'
The Appellate Body took great care to point out that the protection
of the environment was of significance to Members of the WTO.282 The
Appellate Body stated that it simply had found the U.S. measure to be
applied in a manner that constituted unjustifiable and arbitrary
discrimination which was not protected under Article XX of GATT
1994.283
CONCLUSION
Balancing the obligations undertaken by WTO Members to
liberalize their trade regimes and the efforts to protect the environment and
endangered species will never be a simple endeavor. The interpretation of
Article XX perhaps will become more uniform after the Appellate Body
decision in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute. To date, however, the tension
between those who strive to protect the environment and those who strive
to liberalize trade regimes continues.
"'0 See id. para. 184.
281 See id.
212 See id. para. 185.
283 See id. para. 186.
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